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I. Time Budget Evidence —Datain Search of Theory
The household production function isbynow an established part of
economic theory. As formulated by Becker, Lancaster, Muth, and others, the
new consumption theory emphasizes the fact that market goods and services
are not themselves the agents that carry utility hut are rathe,r inputs In
a process that generates commodities (or characteristics) which, in turn,
yield utility. A second feature, introduced into the analysis by Becker,
is that market goods and services are not the only input in thisprocess,
the other input being the consumer's time. By this approach (Becker, 1965)
the consumer maximizes welfare subject to the time and budget constraints where
welfare is a function of commodities, which are "producedt' using market goods
and time.
The new approach has been put to wide use in the analysis of fertility,
health, consumption, labor supply, and transportation demand (to name just a
few). A fact that seemed to have slipped the users' attention is
that the theory does not really discuss household production in the common
sense of the term.' It discusses (to use Lancaster's terminology) consumption
technology, but has very little to say (in its current form) on home production.
It was Mincer who first pointed out (Mincer, 1962) that, at least in thecase of
women, one should distinguish between work at home and leisure, but this
distinction (so conmon in everyday language) disappeared in Becker's more2
generalformulation. This omission was partly due to practical difficulties
in distinguishing between the two, given the large number of borderline
cases (e.g., is playing with a child leisure or work at home?), but partly
because it has not been shown that our understanding of household behavior
will be enriched by this distinction. whatever the reason, the theory of
the allocation of time in its current form is of little help where it is
most needed; namely, In the analysis of time budget data.
From the theoretical point of view, the justification for aggregating
leisure and work at home into one entity, "non—market time" (or "home time")
can rest on two assumons: a. the two elements react similarly to changes
in the socio—economic environment and, hence, nothing is gained by studying
them separately, and b. the two elements satisfy the conditions of a composite
input, I.e., their relative price is constant, and there is no interestin
Investigating the composition of this aggregate since it has no bearing on
production and the price of the output. This study sets out to show that
none of these assumptions holds. Recent time budget findings have established
that work at home is affected differently by changes in soclo—economic var-
iables than is leisure, and this paper shows that the aggregation is also
suspect from the analytical point of view.
The time use patterns of U.S. and Israeli families have beenstudied by
Bloch (1973) and myself (Gronau, 1976). Table 1 summarizes these findings,
describing the signs of the regression coefficients of the major determinants
of the allocation of time. In spite of the differences in methodology and
in the nature of the data used,2 the two studies are unanimous in pointing
outthat changes in the secio-economic enviruninent (e.g.,changes in the wage3
rate, income, education and number of children) have different effects on
work at home and leisure and on the allocation of time of husbands and wives.
According to the Israeli data, an increase in the wife's education resuits
in an increase in the time she spends in the labor market. This time is with-
drawn primarily from work at home, leaving leisure unaffected (and perhaps
even increased). The U.S. findings are much more specific, distinguishing
between income effects and price effects. An increase in the wife's wage
rate increases her supply of labor and reduces both work at home and leisure.
A change in the wife's wage does not affect her husband's work in the market,
but is positively correlated with his work at home, and, hence, negatively
correlated with his leisure. An increase in the husband's wage rate increases
his own supply of labor (mainly at the expense of his work at home), but
reduces that of his wife. This change does not affect the wife's work at home,
and consequently it increases the wife's leisure. An increase in non—wage income
reduces the supply of labor of both husband and wife, it reduces work at home
(at least in the case of women) and, hence, increases leisure.
Finally, both studies concur that children cause their mothers to trans-
fer time from market to home tasks. However, the amount of time transferred
falls short of the additional time required to care for children, leading also
to a reduction of leisure. Children have the same deterrent effect where the
fathers' leisure is concerned, but in this case the fathers increase both
work at home and work in the market.
The total time available for work at home and leisure depends to a
large extent on the person's employment status. Comparing the allocation
of time of employed and not employed Israeli married women (table 2), it is4
observed that controlling for education, the employed have less leisure than
the not employed. The employed Israeli married woman worked In the market
on the average 4.3 hours. She was able to conserve 2.8 hours by cutting her
work at home, but 1.5 hours had to come at the expense of leisure arid time spent
on physiological needs.
Married men work more in the market than the not married, and married
women spend more time in work at home (and somewhat less in the market) than
the not married. Consequentlyit is observed (Gronau, 1976), that married
peoplehave less leisure than the not married, and the difference is greater
for males than for females. These differences are explained by two factors —
marriageand the existence of children. To isolate the effect of marriage, I
ran separate regressions for all males and for all females who did not have
young children (i.e., children in age group 0 —5,or alternatively, children
in the age group 0 —12).The dependent variable is the time spent on the
activity, and the explanatory variables include the person's age, schooling,
land of origin, length of residence and number of older children; marital
status is represented by a dummy variable. (For lack of space, I do
not present the detailed regressions here.)
Controlling for the number of children (and the other socio—economic
variables), I found that marriage reduces the Israeli wife's supply dl work
to the market and increases her work at home. The decline in the work in the
market (about 1.5 hours a day) is somewhat smaller than the Increase in work
at home (about 2 hours), but the difference is too small to be significant
(the time spent on physiological needs and, to a lesser extent, the time
spent on leisure decline, bitthedecline is statistically Insignificant).5
As for males, they hardly increase their work at home but increase signif 1—
cantly their supply of labor to the market (by about 2 hours). This results
in a significant drop in married males' leisure.
When the interaction terrn.s of marriage and schooling are introduced into
the equations, a puzzling asy'iiinetry appears in the Israeli data. In the case
of women, the effect of marriage seems to be either the same for all education
groups or to depend on the wife's education; none of the activIties is affected
by the husband's schooling. On the other hand, in the case of males, the effect
of marriage on the allocation of time depends invariably on the education of
their wives. The greater the wife's schooling, the more the husband works both
in the market and at home '.nd the less leisure he has.
These findings give rise to several questions: Why do education, the
wage rate, and income have a different effect on work at home and leisure?
What explains the effect of children? What explains the differences in the
allocation of time between labor force participants and nonparticipants?
What explains the differences between females' and males' time use patterns?
How can one explain the effect of marriage and what is the source of the
asymmetry in the effect of marriage on the husband's and wife's time use patterns?
Answering these questions, we shall observe that the distinction between
consumption time and production time (I.e., leisure and work at home) has
implications reaching far beyond the analysis of home time usage, embracing
such topics as labor supply, fertility, marital stability, consumption (and
in particular the demand for substitutes for the person's home services)
and the reevaluation of the contribution of housewives to total economic
welfare.
The paper opens with a description of a theoretical model that seems to
provide us with a unifying explanation of the observed time use patterns.6
Some of the crucial assumptions of this modelare tested in section III. The
implications of the model for the analysis of fertility, marital stability,
the demand for housemaids and child care, and the evaluation of the output
of the home sector are investigated in sectIon IV. A summarizing section
discusses some qualifications and suggests some future research.
II. The Model
A. The Simple Case of a Single—Person Household and One Commod
Alayman's distinction between work at home (i.e., home production time) and
leisure (i.e., home consumption time) is that work at home (like work in the
market) is something he would rather have somebody else do for him (if the
cost were low enough) while it would be almost impossible for him to enjoy
his leiure through a surrogate. Thus, one regards work at home as that time
use that generates services which have a close substitute in the market while
leisure has only poor substitutes in the market. In a somewhat extreme case,
work at home and work In the market are perfect substitutes as far as the
direct utility they generate Is concerned, and the person is indifferent to
the composition of the goods and services he consumes —whetherthey are
produced at home or purchased in the market.
Formally, let there be a single—person household. The person maximizes
the amount of commodity Z, which is a combination of goods and services (X)
and consumption time (L):
Z =Z(X,L). (1)
The goods can either be purchased in the market or produced at home, but
the compositon of X does not affect I shall measure the value of home7
goods and services (Xd) in terms of theft market equivalents (i.e., the cost
of the quality—corrected goad in the market). Let denote market expendi-
tures; then total consumption Is composed of the consumption of goods pur—
chased in the market and those produced at. home
X=XM+XH (2)
Home goods are produced by work at home (H)
XH =f(H), (3)
subject to decreasing marginal productivity (f' >0,f" <O)The decline
In the value of marginal productIvity at home is due not oaiy to fatigue or
changes in input proportions but also due to changes in the composition of
—ashift towards activities that have a cheaper market substitute, as H
increases.
The maximization of Z is bound by two constraints: a) the (endogenous)
budget constraint
xMWN+v, (4)
where W Is the person's wage rate (which is assumed to be constant), N denotes
market work and V other sources of income; and b) the time constraint
L+H+N=T.5 (5)S
Thenecessary conditons for an interior optimum call for the marginal
product of work at home to equal the marginal, rate of substitution between
goods and consumptiontime, which inturn equals the shadow price of time (W*)
f'_W. (6)




Theseconditions are depicted in figure 1. Thehome production function
isdescribed by the concave curve TBA0C0. The more time the individual spends
working at home (as measured by the horizontal distance from point T), the
greater the amount of home goods produced. if the individual spends all his
time in work at home, he can produce an amount of 0C0 units of goods. in the
absence of market opportunities, the curve TBA0C0 is the opportunity frontier
enclosing the set of all feasible combinations of X and L. The existence of
a market where the person can sell his working time and buy market goods
expands this set. Thus, given the real wage rate W (described by the slope
of the line A0E0), the person can trade. his time for goods along the price line
A0E0 (the line tangent to the production curve TBA0C0). In the optimum
the person may choose a goods—intensive combination of X and L, such as B0,
where he enjoys 0L0 units of consumption time, spends L0N time units in work
in the market,and spends NT time units in work at home. Alternatively, the
person may have a high preference for leisute Ii e. ,aleisure—intensive9
consumption technology), choosing as his optimum combination the point B.
In this case he does not work in the market, splitting his time between lei-
sure (0L) and work at home (LT).
Note that the person may adopt a goods-intensive technology, such as
but it.may stillbe home—time intensive in the sense that a large part
of the goods are produced at home. Thus, leisure intensive and home—time
intensiveare not synonymous. Note further that if the marginal productivity
of work at home at the point T falls short of the real wage rate, there is
no home production and we are faced with the familiar Robbins diagram and the
dichotomy of work (in the market) and leisure.
To analyze the properties of this model, let it be assumed that there
Is an increase in other sources of income by an amount of iSV. An increase
in other sources of income secures for the person the amount of OX0 of market
goods even If he spends all his time in consumption. The change is reflected,
therefore, In a vertical shift of the production curve TBA0CQ to TDBA1C1.
The change does not affect the marginal productivity of work at home —it
does not affect the shape of the curve but only its location. Since the real
wage rate is given, there is no change in the point where the person finds it
cheaper to buy the goods in the market rather than produce them at home. If
the person prefers a goods—intensive consumption technology which makes him
work in the market (combination B0), he does not change the amount of time he
spends working at home (NT), and given the pure income effect, he expands his
amount of leisure (if leisure is not an inferior input) at the expense of
work at the market (consumption time increase from 0L0 to 0L1 and work in
the market is reduced from L0N to
If, on the other hand,, the person does not initially work in the market
(point B), the increase in income and the resulting increase in Z call for10
an increase in consumption time which can come only at the expense of work
at home.
Let there be an increase in the real wage rate W (figure 2). If the
person works in the market (point B0) a change in wages affectsboth the rate
of substitution between consumption time and goods and the profitability of
home production. The increase in wages lowers the price of goods in terms
of time and, hence, makes home production less profitable and encourages
substitutuiofl of goods for consumption time. This change wIll, therefore,
definitely cut work at home (from N0T to N1T), while its effect on leisure is
indeterminate. The substitution effect tends to lower leisure, while the
expansion effect tends to raise it. As for work in the market, it depends
on the extent of the reduction of work at home and on the change in consumption
time. If the reduction in work at home exceeds the increase (if there is one)
of leisure, the supply of work to the market increases. The tendency of this
supply curve to be positively sloped increases the greater the rate of sub-
stitution between goods and consumption time, the less sensitive the marginal
productivity in home production to changes in the amount of work, and the
smaller the income elasticity of leisure.
If the person initially does not work, the change in wages maylurehim
Into the market (point B), or he may be completely unaffected (point Bc).
A third kind of change that is worth examining is a change in produc—
tivity. It is impossible to predict the Implications of this change without
specifying the exact nature of.the changes in home productivity (i.e., changes
in f) and consumption technology (i.e., changes in Z). In the absence of
such knowledge, one's predictions are limited to the case where the person
works in the market. In thIs case a change in consumption technology should11
affect work in the market and leisure but would leave work at home unchanged.
On the cther hand, an increase in the productivity of work at home is asso-
ciated with an increase In real income arid an increase in leisure, but its
effect on work at home and work in the market is indeterminate.
Up to this point, it was assumed that entry Into the market is costless.
In effect, work in the market Involves costs both in terms of money and in
terms of time. Let these costs be C and t, respectively, and let them be
independent of the amount of work N (e.g., transportation costs and time).8




where S is a dummy variable that describes the person's employment status
fl whenN>O (7) IO whenN=O.
The person is faced by two alternative opportunity sets (figure 3). If he
stays out of the labor force and confines himself to home production, he can
choose any point on the boundary TB1E. On the other hand, if he decides to
join the labor force, he suffers a loss of t units of time and C units of X,
but his opportunity locus becomes T'AF. Given these opportunity sets, a
person with a greater preference for goods will join the labor force (pcint B0),
spending 0L0 units of time on leisure, working in the market for L0N units,12
)
workingat home for Nt units and, say, traveling to work for tT units of time.
A person with a greater taste for leisure will decide to stay out of the mar-
ket (point B1), dividing his time between leisure and work at home (0L1 and L1T,
respectively). Given the opportunity set, labor force participation is asso-
ciated) therefore, with a decline both in leisure and in work athome.9 The
existence of entry costs does not affect, however, our previous conclusions
about the effect of changes in the soc'lo—economic characteristics on the
allocation of time.
The predictions of this simple model, are by and large consistent with our
observations. An increase in the wage rate should not affect the allocation of
time of the not employed but should reduce the work at home of the employed.
Thus, on the average, one should expect the wage rate and work at home to be
negatively correlated. The effect of a change in the wage rate on leisure
depends on the relative magnitudes of the income effect and the substitution
effect. The tendency for the income effect to dominate increases with the
number of hours. Thus, it is not surprising that the substitution effect is
the dominant factor in the case of the wife's leisure, but the two factors
cancel out (or even the income effect dominates) in the case of the husband.
An Increase in non-wage income should not affect the work at home of employed
persons but should reduce the work at home of the not employed. Consequently,
one expects non—wage income and wives' work at home to be negatively corre-
lated. On theother hand, in the case of males who are mostly employed, the
negative effect should be much less pronounced and may be insignificant.
In either case, one expects non—wage income and leisure to be positively
correlated. Finally, in the presence of market entry costs, employed persons
should spend less time or work at homethanthe unemployed, but this difference13
is swamped by the difference in the market hours. Consequently, one expects
that, other things being equal, the employed work longer hours (in the market
and at home) and enjoy less leisure.
Next, one has to explain the effect of children on their parents' allo-
cation of time. This will allow us also to reexamine the conclusions of the
model in a somewhat more realistic setting, where there exists more than one
activity.
B. A World of Two Commodities —TheEffect of Children on Their Parents'
Time Use
Let there be two commodities, Z1 and Z2. Each of these commodities
is a combination of consumption time and goods (Li. X1), nd it is assumed,
for simplicity, that their production functions (equation (1)) are linear
homogenous. These production functions differ between commodities and
are independent of each other (i.e., the production process of Z1
isunaffected by the level and the wayisproduced). There Is no
joint production or consumption (i.e., the same unit oftime cannot be
usedsimultaneously in the production of two goods or two commodities))
The person maximizes his welfare
U U(Z1, Z2) (8)
subject to the budget constraint (4) and the time constraint (5),where
— +XM2, L —L1
+ L2 and H —H1
+ H2. I also define (somewhat
artificially) N —N1
+ N2 where N X/W is the work time required14
to buy X, and T1 L + H1 + N1 the total time spent on Z(here T1 + T2T).
Given the allocation of time to any one of the commodities
one can derive (by equations (6) arid (6')) the optimumallocationof
this time between its different uses, L1, H and N1. To give a complete
picture of the optimum allocation of time and goods one has,however, to
describe the process by which Z. and consequentlyT1 are determined.
This calls for the derivatIon of the transformationcurve between the
two commodities.
Let it be assumed that V =0and that there are no entry costs into
the labor force. Given the allocation of timeT1 to each of the two activi—
ties,a person works in the market if for any activity i the time allotted
to that activity exceeds the time he wants to work at home plus the corres-
ponding amount of leisure
>H+ f1(H)=T1* (9)
pi
where H is the amount of work at home at which f'1(H) =Wand where p1 is
the goods intensity of activity 1 (X1/L.) at the wage rate W. Given the home
production function (i.e., given H and f1(H*)) and given the consumption
technology (i.e., Pt), there is a greater probability the person works
in the market the greater the amount of the activity demanded (i.e., the
greater Ti). On the other hand, given T1, the probability of participa-
tion Increases the lower H and f(H) and the greater the goods intensity
p1.
Assume Inequality (9) holds for activity Z1 for sufficiently large
values of T1, but is not satisfied forZ2 regardless of the amount produced15
(T >T).A8 long as the person works in the market (i.e., T1 >T1*,T2 <
increasingZ2 at the expense of invclves increasing home production of K42
and consumption time L and reducing work in the market N, and the consumption
time associated with (home production of is unaffected). Thus, regardiss
of the leisure intensity of Z1 an increase in Z2 results in a decline in
the supply of labor to the market and an increase in home production, The
amount of leisure increases if Z2 is leisure intensive and declines when
is goods intensive. Eventually, the point is reached where T1 T and
the person drops out of the labor force. Any further increase of Z2 should
reduce work at home and increase leisure when Z2 is leisure intensive and
leads to the opposite result if is goods intensive (see figure 411)
The transformation curve is concave. The marginal productivity
of time in the home production of the two goods differs, and the increase
in time allotted to Z2 makes a diminishing contribution to the output of
Z2. A wage increase reduces Tt and, hence, increases the tendency to
participate in the labor force. It reduces the price of Z1 in terms of
time if >T*and shifts the corresponding section of the transformation
curve upward.
It is easy to apply the analysis to the case where for both activities
Tj* >T,or where Tj* <Tbut ZT1* >T. Of special interest, however,
is the case where T +< T;i.e., the person buys at least one of the
goods X in the market. Since it is assumed (for the time being) that the
person does not have any other sources of income (V0), this assumption
implies that the person works in the market regardless of the combination16
of activities consumed. Let T >Tfor both activities, i.e., the person
buys both and XM2 in the market. Given the wage rate W, transfering
time from activity Z1 to activity does not involve any change in the
amount of time spent in work at home, nor does it affect the marginal rate
of substitution between goods and leisure. Assuming the consumption techno-
logy is characterized by constant returns to scale, the:re is no change in
the goods intensity of the two commodities. The change in the time allotted
to activity Z. (AT.) affects, therefore, only consumption time and work in
the market and they vary by the same rate
AT =AL1
+ AN1 =
AL1+ (AX1! W) =[(1/p1)+ (li x1AZ1 (10)
wherep1 =AX1/AL.is the (marginal) goods intensity ofactivity i and
xi =AX1/AZ1Is the marginal goods input InZ1. By the assulrption of
linear homogeneity,p1 andx1 are independent of the level of Z and,
hence, the price of Z1 in terms of time remains constantas long as W
Is given and the person works in the market. In therelevant range the
transformation curve Is a straight line (figure 6).
As more time is withdrawn fromZ1, the point is reached where the
individual decides to drop out of the market forX. Beyond this point
any additional time has to be withdrawn from leisure and work at home.
However, cutting work at home Increases the marginal productivity of time
and lowers the price of in terms of time. The increase in
due to the increase in its time shareT2 remains constant, resulting in
an in_reasing price of Z2 in terms of Z1) asZ2 increasesThe trans-
formation curve becomes, therefore,concave beyond a certain point (point Gb).17
Alternatively, if one increases at the expense of Z2, the person may
reach the point where he or she stops buying XM2 and relies exclusively on
home production (X2X.d2). At this point (C0) the price of Z2 in terms of
Z1 declines and the transformation curve becomes concave.
The transformation curve consists, therefore, of a part which is
a straight line bounded by two concave segments.12 Let be the leisure—
intensive activity. The introduction of Z2 and the transfer of time from
the leisure—intensive to the goods—intensive activity is accompanied by
an increase in work at home and a decline in work at the market and leisure.
As Z2 increases there comes a point (T2 =T)where it ceases to be prof—
itable to increase the home production of X. Any additional increase in
Z2 should not affect work at home, and since time is shifted to the goods—
intensive activity, work in the market should increase at the expense of
leisure. Eventually, the point is reached (T1 9)whereany additional
cuts in have to come at the expense of home production work at home
and leisure diminish while the supply of labor is increased (figure 5).
A wage increase shifts the transformation curve upward (a shift
from K0G0G!JK to K1G1GK in figure 6), and changes the relative
price of the two activities. It reduces the price of if Its production
involves market goods (XMl >0),the rate of decline being positively
related (by equation 10) to the goods intensity of the activity. Thus,
a wage Increase should increase the price of 21 relative toZ2 as long as
>9 (i.e.,In the section G1GjKj). However, when the person relies
in the production of Z2 exclusively on home production(T2 <9) the
relative price of Z2 should increase with wages (section
K1G1).18
It has been shown in the case of the one—commodity world that a
wage increase reduces the amount of work at home and its effect on leisure
and work In the market is indeterminate. In a two—conodity world, the
tendency for the labor supply function to be positively sloped isincreased by
the substitution effect which favors the market goods intensive commod-
ity (the commodity that entails work in the market). Still, the final
outcome depends on the production functions of home goods f1, the con-
sumption technology Z, the elasticity of substitution between the commod-
ities and their income elasticities.
Removing the assumption that there exist no other sources of income,
the person can obtain market goods without having to work in the market.
An increase in other sources cf income tends, therefore, to reduce
labor force participation. As long as the person works in the market and
buys all market goods (XM. >0for I =1,2), an increase in V shifts the
transformation curve upward but does not change the relative price of the
two commodities)3 The parallel shift in the transfOrmation curve creates
an Income effect which increases both activites. The increase in the derived
demand for leisure is satisfied by diverting time from work in the market
to leisure, leaving work at home unchanged.
With minor exceptions the analysis of this section supports our
previous conclusions. Changes in the wage rate, other sources of income,
and home productivity (not discussed here) have a very similar effect on
the allocation of time in the two—commodity world as in the one—commodity
world4 The analysis sheds, however a new light on the effect children have
on the allocation of time. Among economists it. is customary to treat children
In the analysis as time—intensive commodities, the argument relying on the rtega—19
tive relationship between the number of children (and in particular young
children) and the supply of labor (Willis, 1973). It seems to me this is
a somewhat oversimplified view. In my terminology children seem to be
essentially a gooth4ntensive commodity, and henceanincrease in the
number of children should cut into a person's leIsure. The introduction
ofchildren, similarly to any other commodity that uses home—produced
goods, should increase work at home and decrease labor supply, but even-
tually this tendency should be reversed and any additionalIncreasesin
thecommodity children should lead to an increase inlabor supply at the
expense of leisure.
Ithas been observed that children have a different effect on
their mothers' and fathers' supply of labor. The factor dominating
women's allocation of time is the Increased scope for home production
associated with the introduction of children. Time is shifted from other
activities to the new activity, involving a shift from work In the market
to work at home. As for fathers, given their lower productivity at
home and their higher wage rate in the market, their scope for home pro-
duction is much more limited. Thus, the effect of children on their
fathers' work at home is much smaller than on their mothers'. On the
other hand, given the goods—intensive nature of children, an increase in
the number of children should increase the fathers' supply of work in the
market. For the same reason, one expects the leisure of both parents to
decline.
The price of market substitutes (maids, nursery school, kindergarten,
schools) declines as the child grows older. Said differently, the real
wage of the mother (in terms of market substitutes) increases as the child20
grows older. This increase leads to a declinein work at home and an increase
in work at the market, but may not increase much the demand forleisure.'5
Similarly,lt seems that in Israel the prices of market substitutes
(maids, nursery school) are cheaper than in theU.S.16 Thus, 'n Israeli
mother should find it less profitable to divert time from work in the market
to work at home when she has a child. The supply of labor of Israeli women,
and in particular of the more educated ones, should therefore be less affected
byyoung children than that of their Amerlcan counterparts (Gronau,1976).
The introduction of children intothe analysis in the contextof a
single-personhousehold is admittedly of little relevance. To make the
analysis more realistic, one has to expand the model to a two—personhouse-
hold. In such a household people interact, and this interaction is often
reflected in their allocation of time. It has been argued (Mincer, 1962;
Gronau, 1973) that a multiperson household is a framework inwhich its
members can reap the gains from specialization and exchange. Our model
gives us new tools to reexamine this exchange.
C. The Case of a Two—Person Household in a World of Two Commodities—
TheGains from_Marriag
Marriageintroduces into people's choice set a new activity,"married
life." The new activity uses in its production home produced goods and,
thus, involves an increase in work at home at the expenseof work in the
market. Furthermore, to the extent that this loosely defined activity
is more goods intensive than the other activities, it should also reduce
leisure. Marriage mayhave,however, a more fundamental effect on the
household members' allocation of time by allowing for specialization within
the family. Much of the preceding dscussicn Is based en the propositien21
that a person is reluctant (or finds it unprofitable) to sell his home
goods outside his household. The analysis mayrequiresome modifications
when we expand the definition of the household from aone—person to a
two—person entity.
Let it be assumed that the household consists of twopersons,
husband and wife (denoted by m and f, respectively), and thereare only
two commodities (one of the commodities may be children). On—the—job
training may make the wife a more efficient producer of home goods, and
discrimination and smaller market involvement result in the wife's earning
a lower wage thanherhusband W >Wf.Given this wage differential, the
male will be happy to give up (w —c)LTofincome (where £> 0)if he
could only get in return tT units of time. The woman, on the other hand,
will be content to do without LT of her time if she could secure in
return an amount of (Wf + £)T of Income. Since >W,there is ample
space for exchange. The only problem hampering the exchange is
limitations on the sale of nonmarket time. These limitations are, how-
ever, somewhat relaxed in the family context.
By definition leisure is an input whicI the person has to provide
himself. Thus, there is no way in which the wife can conserve on her hus-
band's leisure. She can, however, conserve on his work—at—home time. Itideed,
the woman who is reluctant to sell her home goods (e.g., serve as a maid)
is willing to exchange them within the family for market goods. The extent
to which such an exchange takes place and the terms of the exchange depend to
a large degree on her marginal costs of producing these goods.
Let it be assumed that in the absence of exchange the husband is
buying some quantity of every good in the market (XM. >0).Were exchange22
to take place, the highest price the husband would be ready to offer for
these goods would be their market price. If the woman also buys these
goods in the market (though she may produce some of them also at home), she
is facing the same prices as her husband, and in spite of the wage differen-
tial there is no room for exchange. If, on the other hand, the wife's
optimal combination of goods before marriage does not involve one of the
market goods, the wife produces that good at a price that is lower than the
market price at which the husband buys it, and there is still place for
specialization —thewife expands her home production in exchange for
market goods.
The amount of goods and services exchanged depends on the terms of
trade. In the short run when the exchange is limited to a specific pairof
people, we are confronted by a inonopoly—monopsony casewith an indeterminate
solution. In a broader context that also encompasses the marriagedecision,
the number of players is not limited to two and the terms of trade (the price
of the home good in terms of the market goods) are determined by thedemand
and the supply of the home good. The husband's home goods demand curvehas
an infinitely elastic section at the prevailing market price. Thus,if at
the market price the husband's demand exceeds the wife's excess supplythe
terms of trade equal the market price, and the gainsfrom the trade accrue
solely to thewife.17 A change in the socioeconomic environment (e.g., an
increase in wage rates or in the family's other sources of income) thatincreases
the demand for home goods (or decreases the wife's excess supply)results in
an interaction in time usage of husbands and wives onlyif it gives rise
to an increase in the terms of trade. On the other hand, if the termsof23
trade are at their maximum (i.e., they equal the market price), they cannot
rise any further and the predictions of the two—person model are iiery simi-
lar to the one—person case.
The different effect marriage isobservedto have on the husband's
and wife's work at home and in the market is due primarily to specialization
and. exchange taking place within the family.18 But what explains the
negativeeffect marriage has on the husband's leisure, and the observed
asymmetry in the effect changes in the spouse's education and wage rate
have on the husband's and wife's allocation of time? One possible answer
is that marriage has a redistributive effect. Equality within the family
calls for husbands and wives to have the same amount of leisure, and since
single men enjoy more leisure than single women, marriage entails a
reduction in males' leisure so thatitequals that of females. Unfortunately,
this explanation provides an answer only to the first question but does
not resolve the second.
An alternative explanation traces the effect of the wife's edu-
cation on her husband's allocation of time to selective mating and to the
effect it has on his investment in human capital. It has been observed
(Benham, 1974) that the wife's education and the husband's wage rate are
positively correlated. If wages have a positive effect on labor supply,
wife's education should be positively related to her husband's work in
the market and negatively related tohis leisure.19 However, this
reasoning falls short of explaining the positive effect wife's education
has on the husband's work at home. Furthermore, why don't we observe the
same factors working on the wife's allocation of time?24
Tomy mind, the explanation lIes in tha asymmetry of the exchange
process taking place within the family. Marriage increases the demand for
thegoods in which the woman has a comparative advantaga, and thus her
gainsfrommarriage may exceedthose of her husband's. Specifically,
marriage affects theallocation of time in two ways: (a) Itcreates a
demand for a new goods—intensive activity that involves home production;
and (b) It allows forspecializatIon within the household. The first of
thesefactors (similarly to the effect of chiidren) should increase the
woman's work at home and reduce her work in the market and leisure. It
should increase the husband's work both at home and in the market at the
expense of leisure. The opening of possibilities for exchange should
reinforcethis tendency for the wife but should decrease
work at home and increasethe work in the market of the husband. The
possibilities for gains from trade are greater the lower the wife's
education. Furthermore, the lower the wife's education, the greater the
probability that these gains will be shared by both husband and wife.
Thus, the less schooling the wife has, the more home tasks she takes over
from her husband the less he works at home, the more leisure he gets
and the less he works in the market. On the other hand, the higher her
education, the smaller the total gains from the exchange and the smaller
his fraction of the gains. Consequently, he works more both in the
market and at home at the expense of leisure. As for the wife, the more
schooling she has the smaller the total gains but the greater her fraction
or the gains from trade. The wife's leisure is affected by two contra-
dictory forces: marriage tends to lower leisure, but the gains from
exchange tend to increase it. The two forces seem to offset each other,
regardless of the wife's schooling, leaving the woman's leisure unchanged.25
III. Some Empiricai Tests
The model gives rise to a wealth of testable hypotheses. Although
many of these hypotheses could have been generated also by other models,
which use a weaker set of assumptions (e.g., the models discussed In my 1973
and 1976 papers), none of them generates this model's prediction concerning the
income effect on work at home. A crucial test of our analysis focuses, there-
fore, on this effect: Does an increase In nonearning income reduce the work
at home of the not employed but leave the work at home of the employed
unaffected? The examination of this hypothesis is the subject of this section.
The data used are the 1972 panel of the Michigan Study of Income
Dynamics. Given the peculiar nature of the subsample of the not employed
males (e.g., a mean age of 68), I confine tl'e discussion to the time usage
of married white females. This sample included 1,281 women, of which 660
were employed sometime during the previous year, and 621 reported they did
not work in 1971. The dependent variables consist of the time spent working
in the market (including travel to work), the time spent in housework, and
leisure.2° The explanatory variables comprised the wife'sage, education ann
labor force experience (i.e., full—time work) since the age of 18, the husband's
education and wage, the family's nonearning Income, the number of children
younger than 18, the number of children In school and the number of rooms
in the home. The regressions were estimated for the whole sample, and sep-
arately for the employed and the not—employed.21
The findings for the whole sample closely resemble those reported
earlier In section 1 and, thus, are not presented here. Table 3 presents
the results for the two separate subsamples. The results confirm the pre—
dictions of the mode1. When the wife is not employed, her work at home is26
negatively affected nd, hence, her leisure is positively affected) by her
nonearnings income and by her husband's wage rate. Children tend to increase
her home tasks, but school children less so than preschool children. Her
work at home is negatively associated with her education, but is positively
associated with the size of her house. As predicted, her potential wage rate
(as approximated by her past labor force experience) does not affect her
allocation of time.
Focusing on employed women, a major determinant of their allocation
of time is their wage rate. This variable explains the negative effect of
labor force experience on work at home and leisure, and the negative effect
of the wife's education on her work at home (education and leisure are posi-
tively correlated in this regression, but the regression coefficient is
insignificant). Children have a negative effect on their mothers' leisure,
the time withdrawn from the market falling short of the increased housework.
As the child grows older and enters school, housework diminishes, but this
change hardly results in any gains in leisure —thetime saved In work at home
is diverted back to the market.22 Most important for our analysis is the
income effect. The husband's wage has a significant positive effect on leisure,
but has no effect on work at home. Similarly, work at home is unaffected by
changes in nonearning income; its effect on leisure is positive, though weak.
It is also worth noticing that the work at home of employed women is uncor—
related with the size of their house —presumablyany extra work associated
with a greater number of rooms is done by maids (or other market substitutes).
To isolate the wage effect from other effects associated with edu-
cation, I introduced this variable directly into the regression. Since the
survey does not include direct inforisation on the hourly wage rate, hourly27
earnings are computed by dividing annual earnings by annual hours (i.e., by
the product of weeks worked and weekly hours). This procedure generates
serious measurement errors which hamper any direct attempt to estimate the
wage effect. To overcome this problem, I used an indirect approach: in the
first stage I estimated the wage function, and in the second stage I intro—
duced the imputed (ln) wage in the time usage functions. The estimated wage
function was of the semi—log variety, the explanatory variables being the
wife's education, her labor force experience and her husband's wage rate
In W =— .5955+ .0905 EDUC + .0302 EXPR —.0006(EXPR)2 + .0442WAGEH2
(9.18) (4.72) (2.99) (4.75) R =.20
where the wages are measured in dollars and the terms-in parentheses denote
the corresponding t values.
The results of the second stage (table 3) do not vary much from our
previous findings. The wage rate has a strong negative effect on both leisure
and work at home. Education is positively correlated with leisure, but its
effect on work at home (though positive) is not significant. (The direct
effect of education on number of hours worked in the market is, therefore,
negative.) Finally, the pure income effect is as predicted: Neither non—
earnings income nor the husband's wage rate affect the employed woman's
work at home. Our theory passes also this test successfully.
IV. So, What's New? —SomeImplications
The model has been shown to yield a cohesive interpretation of the
findings on the allocation of time between work in the market, work at home
and leisure. It explains the different behavior patterns of people with28
)
differentincomes, wages and education, and the effect of children on the
allocation of time, It accounts for the different patterns observed for
males and females, married and not married, employed and not employed, and
it seems, in general, to provide the economist with more refined tools to
analyze time budget data. But does the theory extend our understanding of
household' behavior beyond this goal? In this section I shall try to show
that the ramifications of the theory reach far beyond the analysis of time
use.
The Supply of Labor. The most direct application of our model is,
of course, to the analysis of labor supply. In the short tun the two most
important economic factors affecting the supply of labor of married women are
income apd wage rates. By our analyiss the income effect works primarily
through its effect on leisure. On the other hand, wage increases tend to
increase the supply of labor by reducing work at home; but their effect on
leisure is indeterminate. Given the wage effect on leisure, the labor supply
is more elastic the greater the sensitivity of work at home to changes in the
wage rate (i.e., the smaller the effect of H on f'). For that reason alone,
one should expect the supply of labor of married women to be more elastic
than that of males. But the analysis brings up a further point: A wage
increase may result not merely in a shift from work at home to work in the
market but also in a reduction of leisure —employedwomen having less leisure
than the not employed. Indeed, according to the estimates presented in table 3,
though the wage elasticities are almost identical (about 0.4), the marginal
effect of a wage change on the leisure of the employed is more than four
times that on work at home. Admittedly, some of these changes in leisure may
be due to changes in activities which are normally regarded as work at home29
but were not defined by the respondent as housework,23 but It is hard to
believe that this misclassification explains such a great difference.
Recent decades have witnessed a great expansion in the labor suprdy
of married women. Still, with only about half the married women participating
In the labor force, and s.Lth the number of working hours of the employed women
being equal to the number of hours they put in work at home, it looks as if
this resource has only been partly tapped for future expansion. A natural
question is to what extent will the labor supply function of married women
resemble that of their husbands' once they reach similar labor force partic-
ipation rates? Right now any answer to this question should be regarded as
sheer speculation, since so much depends on changes in role differentiation,
and reallocation of work at home within the family. it is, however, worth
noticing that right now women are more willing to dispense with leisure in
response to increases in wages than men (a one percent change in wages changes
the employed wives' leisure by almost twice that of males'), and that males
are apt to increase their leisure in response to increases in income much more
than women (the ratio of the income effects is about 5:l).24
In the long run, changes in wages are associated with changes in
education. But while wage increases reduce both work at home and leisure,
the effect of education Is confined to the first factor. The prospects for
increased labor supply due to increases in education are, therefore, much more
limited than In the short run. On the other hand, one can expect further
expansions in labor supply If the increase in education and wages is associated
with a decline in fertility.
The Demand for Children. It is customary for economists to argue
that children are a home—time intensive activity and, therefore, an increase
In children reduces work In the market. A corollary of this conclusion is30
/
theargument that since children are time intensive, an increase in their
mothers' wage rates should raise their price relative to that of other
commodities. Given our analysis, one has to distinguish between home time
intensity and leisure intensity (or average arid marginal home—time intensity).
Children may be home-tiDe intensive when they are introduced into the house-
hold since some of the, goods used in the actvlty can be profitably produced
at home. However, as one increases this activity, the profitability of home
production diminishes and eventually the family relies (on the margin) solely
on market goods. At this point the goods—intensive nature of children becomes
apparent. Thus, while in the range where children!s goods.. are produced at
horn; an increase in wage increases the price of children; when these goods
are replaced by market goods, the increase in wage reduces it. The tendency
to repice home goods by market goods increases with the mOther's wage rate.
Thus, one should expect that the price of children increases with the
mother's wage for low wage mothers but that this relationship is reversed
as the mother's wage increases. Ben Porath (1973) observes for Israeli
women a transpose J shape relationship between fertility and education —
fertilitydeclines with education but there is a slight inflection at the
25
top. These findings are consistent with the moael's prediction. The
price of housernaids relative to the wife's wage seems to be lower in Israel
than in the U.S. and the tendency to replace housemaid services for the
wife's time is, therefore, greater there. Consequently, the transpose J
shape relationship between fertility and the wife's education should be
more pronounced in the Israeli data.
The price of market substitutes relative to the wife's wage declines
with the child's age. The goods_intensive nature of children becomes, there-
fore, more explicit as the child grows older. The relative price of "older31
children" has a greater tendency to declLne with the parent's wage. The
overall effect of changes in the wage rate on the present value of the cost
of children is, therefore, indeterminate and depends on the price of market
substitutes, the rate of discount, etc.
The Gains from Marria. Past studies (e.g., Becker, 1973) have
asserted that the gains from marriage depend on the husband—wife wage ratio.
Other things being equal, the hIgher the husband's wage rate relative to
his wife's the greater the opportunity for specialization within the house-
hold and the greater the gains from trade. This conclusion has to be
somewhat modified if one realizes that there exists no direct way for trading
one's leisure and that the exchange is confined to home goods. The scope for
gains from exchange within the household is limited by the profitability of home
production. The latter, in turn, depends on the wife's home productivity and the
price of market substitutes. Given the wife's home productivity and the price
of market substitute the higher the wife's wage the greater the probability that
any change in her activities may change the composition of her market goods but
will not affect her home production. In this case the prices of goods confronting
males and females are the same and there are no gains to be reaped from trade.
The gains from trade decline, therefore, with the wife's wage rate irrespectIve
of the husband's wage. The increase in marital instability that has accompanied
the increase in wives' real wage rates and their increased participation in the
labor force is consistent with the prediction of the model, though one does, not
witness any substantial narrowing of the sex wage gap (Fuchs, 1974)26.32
Taxes,ChildcarePrrams, and the Demand forDomesticHelp. It is
often claimed that the wife' entry into the labor force Involves costs such as
childcare and housemaid services which exceed by far the husband's cost of
entry. According to this argument, childcare services should be tax deductible,
as are books or other costs the person must undertake In order to work. This
argument has been accepted by many legislators and incorporated into the tax
laws.
The analysis points out the fallacy of this argument. An increase in
the expenditures on childcare services is associated with the wife's work in
the same way an increase in the expendItures on a gardener is associated with
the husband's work. As distinguished from expenditures on books or commuting
costs (and time), it is not a cost which is a prerequisite to work but rather
a cost which the family willingly undertakes because it finds that it is
unprofitable for the wife to spend her time in childcare activities.
The analysis emphasizes, however, an additional point. In
evaluating the various childcare programs which have been proposed or enacted
in recent years, one has to distinguish between their effect on the marginal
rate of substitution between goodsand leisure and their effect on the profit—
ability of home production. Assume a one commodity world where the only
commodity is "children." A program which gives the mother a fixed childcare
subsidy for every hour worked is equivalent to a wage increase and affects
both the profitability of home production and the price of leisure. On the
other hand,a fixed cash rebate or free childcare services which are conditional
on a minimum number of working hours does not affect the profitability
of home production of working women and ay only affect theIr
demand for leisure. When it comes to non—working women this kind of program33
encourages labor force participation (in particular if entry into the market
involves fixed costs) and may affect both home production and leisure. Finally,
a tax deduction of childcare expenditures which declines gradually with earnings
may affect home production but not affect the price of leisure.
It has been argued (Heckman, 1974) that to evaluate and compare the
Impact the various programs have on labor supply and welfare, it is sufficient
to kno, the indifference curves between market goods and non—market time. Our
analysis indicates that this knowledge may not be sufficient and that a thorough
evaluation may require specific knowledge of both the household production
function f(H) and consumption technology (Z)2
Finally, it seems at first puzzling that work at home is so insensitive
to change3 in income, given the high income elasticity of the demand for
housemaids.28 T'-ie puzzleis, however, resolved if one realizes that the
demand for housemaid services (as many other services) is an excess demand.
An increase in income does not increase the profitability of producing these
services at home when the person is employed and reduces the profitability
when he is not employed (the shadow price of time increasing).Thus, changes
in Income may have a strong effect on the excess demand for these market
services and no effect (or even a negative one) on home services.
The Evaluation of the Home Sector Output. Along standing complaint
waged against the current national accountingsystem is its omission of the
output of the non—market sector, and specifically, theoutput of wives at
home, which constitutes according to some estimates(Morgan, 1966) close to
40 percent of measured GNP. Severalattempts have been made to correct this
shortcoming (Morgan, 1966, Nordhaus & Tobin, 1973,Slrageldin, 1969) but these
attempts were plagued by an ensuingcontroversy over what nrices should he used in34
evaluating the wife's output. Should one use the value women seem to assign
to their tine (Gronau, 1973) or should one use the market pricesof the services
rendered by the wives (Sirageldin, 1969, Walker & Gauger, 1973). The model
provides an analytical tool to resolve this controversy.
If the wife works in the market and at least some of each good is
purchased (X >0),her value of marginal, productivity at home equals her
wage rate (f W). Since most of the goods produced at home are in the
nature of services, she assigns to these goods a value that equals the wage
she would have to pay somebody to do the work for her divided by the average
produtivity of that person (= Wu/APHi).The value placed on the last unit
of work at home equals, therefore,
W =
WHfI/APHi
Using the wage W11 of the service worker who can replace the wife in home
production serves as a good approximation for the value of her time only if
his or her average productivity equals the wife's marginal productivity. If
>APHithe wage of the service worker will underestimate the price the
wife assigns to her marginal unit of time in work at home.
To estimate the value of home production, it is not sufficient to
know the value of the marginal unit of work at home but one has to know the
home production function f(H) itself. Multiplying the number of hours the
wife works at home by her hourly wage rate understates the value of her home
output If the law of margIr'] oroductivity prevails. Furthermore, it has
been shown that if none of thc goods are not purchased in the market (K=0), Mi
tvalueof the marginal productivity of her dme in their production at home exceeds35
the wage rate. Finally, if the woman does not work in the market, her shadow
price of time exceeds her expected wage rate. It seems, therefore,highly




I believe that this paper provides ample evidence for establishing
the distinction between work at home and leisure as an integral part of the
theory of the allocation of time and household production. It has beenshown
that this distinction is a prerequisite for any further investigation of time
use patterns and is highly useful in the analysis of fertility, marriage,
childcare programs, labor force participation, and the evaluation of the output
of the nonrnarket sector. I am confident the model will also be found fruitful
for the analysis of problems in other fields, such as medical economics or
transportation demand, in which the household production model has been put
to good use.
It is clear that the model is incomplete. I expect major criticism
to be launched against the assumption that work at home involves the same
marginal utility as work in the market. Childcare, cooking, gardening, etc.
clearly create direct utilities (positive or negative). The psychic income
derived from these activities relative to that derived from work in the market
may vary with the person's socioeconomic characteristicsand affects his
behavior. Admitting the validity of this criticism, I contend that it Is not
more serious than in the case of the dichotomy of home time vs. work in the
market. Psychic income (or leisure ac work) Is an important determinant of
investment in human capital, occupational choice and the supply of labor.36
Economists have not been able up to now to derive a satisfactory method to
isolate this factor. This has not hampered research on the determinants of the
supply of work to the market and it sould not block research on the supply
of work at home.
A second point of criticism may focus on the neglect of joint produe-
tion and joint consumption. These are important features of human behavior
which are not adequately treated by our analysis.3° ut ln this respect our
model does not do worse (or better) than the current model of household
production.
Finally, in the empirical part of this paper I have investigated
only a small fraction of the implications of the model for the household
allocation of time and consumption patterns. Topics such as the interaction
between work at home and substitute market services, or the interaction
between entry costs (time and money) and time usage have only been touched
upon. More ambitious endeavors such as the estimation of the household
production function and the value of home output are still in a blueprint
stage. However, given the right data, it is hoped that this paper will
provide the framework that will facilitate their realization.37
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FOOTNOTES
This paper has been britten while on sabbatical at the National
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accorded the NBER studies.
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Mincer and Donald Parsons for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper,
and to Kris Chinn and Kyle Johnson for computational assistance.
'One exception is (Penman, 1969, Ch. 1). After writing the initial
draft of this paper, I have become aware of another two exceptions; namely,
Bloch (1973) and Sharir (1975). Both suggest models that are in many respects
similar to the one suggested here but do not analyze all the implications of
this model.
2The U.S. and the Israeli data differ both in the nature of the depen-
dent variables and in the degree of detail of the explanatory variables. In
the American survey (ihe 1964 Productive American study), people were asked
how much time they spent annually in regular and irregular housework and
how much in market work. Leisure was defined in thIs study as the residual.
In the Israeli survey (conducted by the Institute of Social Research in
Jerusalem), people were asked how they spent each hour of the previous day.
The survey included 48 activities which I classified into four major groups
(work In the market, work at home, leisure and physiological needs, only the40
first three of which are reported in table 1). The respoqdents'background data
are much more detailed in the American survey.The Israeli survey does not
contain any information on the person's wage rate, and one has to useeduca-
tion as a very imperfect proxy.
3This assumption is crucial to the model and distinguishes this model
from previous formulations such as Z =Z(XM, XHL) (Gronau, 1973) that had
only very limited predictive power.
4For simplicity I ignore the market goods that enter into the produc-
tion of home goods.
5Thus, one can easily rewrite equation (1)
z= z(x, L)=z'(x, L,T—L) =Z'(X,L, H + N), (1')
i.e.,H and N are perfect substitutes as far as the consumption technology
(Z) is concerned.
6Equatlons (6) and (6')arederived by maximizing the Lagranglan
function
G=z[(XM+f(H)),L] +)JWN+V -X]+ p(T -L-H—N]
with respect to L, H, N and XM.The shalow.price of time (measured in real
terms)equals
=p/A
where iandA arethemarginal utilities of time and income, respectively.41
The wage rate may fall short of the value of marginal productivity
at home O <f')either because of the person's reluctance to perform the
home services outside of his own home or because of differences in the value
of marginal productivity between home and the outside, due to transportation
costs, monitoring costs and efficiency (the person being self—employed in
his own home)
7The decline in work in the market may result in some cases in the
person's dropping out of the labor force altogether.
8One can easily treat variable time and money costs (i.e., costs that
vary with N) by an appropriate modification of the wage rate.
alternative interpretation of the different patterns of time use of the
employed and not employed traces them to differences in productivity at home,
the less productive person having a stronger inclination to join the labor
force.
10Thjsassumptionhas come recently under heavy criticism by Pollalc and
Wachter (1975). I adopt it reluctantly for the sake of simplicity.
The figures 4 and 5 do not pretend to describe the relative magni-
tudes of L, H, and N but only the direction of their change as more time is
allotted to Z2.
the special case where the productivity of the person in the
production of one of the home goods is very low and he relies exclusively on
market goods (X. =0),the transformation curve has only one concave segment.
long as N >0for any combination of and Z2, the concave sec—
dons of the transformation curves are unaffected by changes in V. However,42
if the Increase in V is sufficiently large to make the person withdraw from
the labor force, for a given set of Z1 and Z2, the transformation curve becomes
concave for those sets. If V is sufficiently large, the person may drop out
of the labor force altogether. If V >Mx[p1(T
—H)
—X]the person does
not work regardless of the combination of commodities chosen.
exception is the case where > but >T(i.e., the person
works in the market, N >0,but does not purchase Z2 market Inputs, XM2 =0).
An increase In V that increases both commodities entails an increase in
leisure and work at home at the expense of work in the market.
5The goods intensity of children may decline with their age, resulting
in an increase in leisure as the child grows older. However, as long as
children are more goods intensive than other activities, they should be
associated with a decline in leisure.
161n Israel many of the 2—year—olds and most of the 3—4 year—olds
attend a nursery for at least four hours a day. In 1968 over 40 percent of
the working mothers with a child less than 3 years old employed a maid (the
fraction for working mothers with 13+ years of schooling was two—thirds.)
17The wJ.fe, however, may find it advisable to "bribe" her husband
to maintain this trading relationship.
18The wife's tendency to specialize in work at home is reinforced if
work in the market involves fixed entry costs. Marriage offers the woman
a job which does not involve these fixed costs at terns which may not be
much inferior to her market wage rate. As a result, the wife may be tempted
to drop out of the labor force and concentrate on work at ome.
)43
'9The positive correlation between the wife's education and the
husband's work in the market reported earlier for Israeli families is
observed by Benham also in the case of American data.
20
The families reported on the number of weeks worked, the number of
hours the wife worked per week, and the number of hours spent in housework
in an average week. (Housework is not defined in the questionnaire, but
the examples mentioned are cooking, cleaning and other work around the house.
Thus, it Is not known whether the families included such activities as
chlldcare and shopping in housework). Leisure was defined by me as the differ-
ence between 8,760 annual hours and the number of hours reported worked in
the market and at home.
21Separating the sample according to employment status may give rise
to selectivity biases. I tried to correct these biases, but had very little
success because of the strong multicollinearity between the correction coat—
ficient and the rest of the explanatory variables. It Is comforting to learn
that recent attempts to correct selectivity biases in labor supply have gen-
erated results that do not differ much from simple OLS estimates based on
the working wives sample (Cogan, 1976).
22The effect of children on leisure, as presented in table 3, is
significant at the conventional 5 percent level only if one uses a one—tailed
test. However, if one removes the variable "school children" fromthe
regression, the variable "number of children" turns out to be highly sig-
nificant by any standard (i.e., t values that exceed 3).
23See note 20. According to the Israeli data, "housework" (not including
childcare) is only two—thirds of the time defined by me as work at home.44
24Thefindingsfor the employed married men (not presented here) are
basedon the same sample as those for the women.
25Ben Porath (1973) explained this relationship in a somewhat similar
fashion, arguing that if the elasticity of substitution between time and goods
in the production of children exceeds unity, children may be a time—intensive
commodity for low—wage mothers but a goods—intensive commodity for high—wage
mothers.
26Fuchs (1974) reports that the sex differential in hourly earnings
of white non—farm employed hardly changed in the last decade (from .61 in
1959 to .64 in 1969). Moreover, the differential for the young (less than
35)married(the group more prone to divorce) has even slightly increased
(from .73 to .70).
270ne can easily incorporate in the analysis additional proposals (e.g.,
a subsidy confined to formal source of childcare) and complicate it by intro-
ducing additional activities or exchange within the household, but this would
not change our basic conclusion.
28Using Israeli data (the Family Expenditure Survey 1968/9), I found that,
even when one controls for the wife's education and employment status, the
inconAe elasticity of houseniaids exceeds unity.
290ne has to qualify somewhat this conclusion because the wage rates
used in the imputations may exceed the nonworking wives' expected wages
(Gronau, 1973).
may very well be that the observed goods intensity of children
can be traced to joint consumptIon and production. Much of the satisfaction
one derives from his children and much of the childcare activity Involves45
just having the children arouud while doing other things, e.g., cooking,
watching TV, etc. Children may riot require, therefore, an increase in leisure
to allow the enjcyment from them.46
Table 1: The Determinants of the Allocation of Time: U.S.and Israel
V
_V —-
Workin Wcrk at Work in Work at
theMarker HomeLeisure the Market HomeLeisure
U.s.(1964)1
Husband's Wage 0 + +
Wife's Wage + 0 +
Non—Wage Income —(?) + o +














Number of + 0(?) 0(?)0(?)
Preschool Children
'The results are based on Bloch (1973).Question marks denote cases where the
direction of the effect depended on the functional form of the -regression equations.
2Based on Gronau (1976).Question marks denote cases where the regression




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: The Determinants of the Aliccation of Time of U.S. Married Women by
Employment Status









































































































































































.2593 .1934 .1657 .1052 .2267 .1680 .1207



















Figure 1 Figure 2
Goods
F
E
0
L1N t T
Figure 3
T'
TimeL,H,N
Z2 Goods Intensive
0
50
L,H,N
K0 K1
Figure 6
Z2 Leisure Intensive
zi
T T2
T2
Ft
L
N
T—T
TT7 T—T
Figure 4
H
L
N
Figure 5
V1
0
C1